"Today the concept of truth is viewed with suspicion, because truth is identified with violence. Over history there have, unfortunately, been episodes when people sought to defend the truth with violence. But they are two contrasting realities. Truth cannot be imposed with means other than itself! Truth can only come with its own light. Yet, we need truth. ... Without truth we are blind in the world, we have no path to follow. The great gift of Christ was that He enabled us to see the face of God".Pope Benedict xvi, February 24th, 2012

The Church is ecumenical, catholic, God-human, ageless, and it is therefore a blasphemy—an unpardonable blasphemy against Christ and against the Holy Ghost—to turn the Church into a national institution, to narrow her down to petty, transient, time-bound aspirations and ways of doing things. Her purpose is beyond nationality, ecumenical, all-embracing: to unite all men in Christ, all without exception to nation or race or social strata. - St Justin Popovitch

Sunday, 17 January 2016


my source: First Things
I joined the Russian Church late in 1989, becoming actively involved in its life soon thereafter. This was two years before the fall of the Soviet Union, and times were hard—inflation, recession, and empty shelves. Our parish community in Klin, some fifty miles outside Moscow, was given the ruins of an old church at the town center. We raked rubble from this deserted building, the first in the Moscow Region to be returned to the Church. It seemed to us a symbol of the new era.

This was the time of the so-called “Church Revival” in Russia—part of the broader cultural transition that was epitomized by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Russian state underwent an identity crisis in the 1990s, with a choice either to democratize or to become a new empire. Its initial decision, in the early Yeltsin years, was in favor of democracy. A similar trend characterized reforms in the Russian Church. Once a Soviet-controlled system, now church life became open to new movements and lay involvement. By the decade’s close, however, these changes in Church and state were proving ephemeral. Today, the Russian Church Revival is complete—and the Church that has been revived is not the one we intended when we rebuilt the ruined church in Klin.o the young parish community I joined in Klin, it was clear that the spiritual renewal of Russia would require ­de-Sovietization. This meant overcoming a complacent mentality that settled for the status quo and did not value individual initiative. We were in need of metanoia: penitence and conversion. This is a difficult task for an individual, more so for a culture. But we were high school and university students, and we had hope.

Beyond our parish, too, the Church Revival was taking anti-Soviet forms, corresponding to the democratic character of the early post-Soviet state. Lay movements arose, among them the Union of Orthodox Fellowships, which brought together grassroots Christian initiatives from all over Russia in the fields of mission, charity, and youth work. In the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, dioceses became autonomous churches within the Moscow patriarchate. New martyrs and confessors, the victims of Soviet persecution, were glorified. This was an important instance of the new openness, for the mere mention of these martyrs and confessors had entailed serious risk a few years before.

Under Soviet rule, priests had been able to celebrate traditional liturgical services—and nothing more. A sermon that irritated local communist authorities could lead to the transfer of the priest to a distant village. Having tea with a priest after Sunday service was a dangerous proposition. Feasts and festivals were illegal. Komsomol (Young Communist League) activists would take the names of ­participants in ­Easter processions and report the participants to their bosses. Komsomol controlled baptisms, weddings, and funeral services.

But in the early 1990s, all of these restrictions were lifted. In many places, parish life was revitalized, and parishes became dynamically developing communities. It was a period of optimism and democratic experimentation.

This early phase of the Church Revival may be called “Church Revival 1.0.” In these years, the Church was esteemed, protected, and accorded ­public significance as an anti-Soviet force. Most Russian citizens were attracted by what the Church had preserved: a culture that was Russian and traditional, but non-Soviet. This was true even for those who had no interest in church doctrines or worship. They wanted to take part in this culture, without quite knowing how. Their instinct, arising from ­decades of Soviet conformism, was to trust and respect the Orthodox clergy. In this way, supporting Church ­Revival 1.0 became an important cultural dimension of de-Sovietization, even while most of its advocates understood little about the Church they proposed reviving.

During Church Revival 1.0, relations with the government were complex. No legal mechanisms existed for cooperation between Church and state. There were no settled procedures for transferring church property to ecclesiastical control, and church educational endeavors were in an unofficial limbo. The government provided money to the Church only on an ad hoc basis. The process of establishing the needed mechanisms was slow and contested. Most state authorities in the 1990s were the same people who had held power during the Soviet era. They were in important ways still pro-Soviet, though in deference to public sentiment, they accommodated the Church. They allowed the Church to establish new seminaries, reopen monasteries, ordain young candidates to the priesthood, develop publishing and media activities free of censorship, and organize pilgrimages within Russia and to the Holy Land, Egypt, and Europe.

The early trends were auspicious. But the process of reform proved slow, incomplete—and reversible. Already by the mid-1990s, ominous signs were coming from the church hierarchy. During the Soviet era, the church leadership had mostly been loyal to the state, incorporated into the Soviet establishment. Bishops participated in public ceremonies and enjoyed the same special access to medical treatment and other perquisites as state and Communist Party leaders. One of the few who had stood aloof was Metropolitan Alexis Ridiger. In 1990 he became Alexy II, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, the first patriarch since the revolution to be chosen without government pressure. Alexy had been born in independent Estonia and remembered its brutal occupation by the Soviets. The personal distance he maintained from the Soviet regime was largely responsible for what independence, or apparent independence, the Orthodox hierarchy maintained in the 1990s.

Meanwhile, no bishop in the Russian Church appreciated the importance of lay movements to Church Revival 1.0. The post-Soviet Church suffered from a shortage of clergy. Moscow in 1989 was a city of ten million, served by only one hundred priests. The revitalization of parish life thus required the organized efforts of laypeople. The episcopate, however, resisted any vision that accorded a greater role to the laity, and feared the laypeople who sought to articulate such a vision. Perhaps the bishops, still Soviets at heart, regarded the lay movements as dangerously democratic, a threat to top-down control of church institutions.

Nonetheless, some lay movements emerged. In October 1990, for instance, the Brotherhood of the All-Merciful Savior received official state recognition. This fellowship united several Moscow-based parishes, their dozen priests, and hundreds of laypeople. Its projects included youth summer camps, gymnasiums, the first pro-life center in Russia, an orphanage, a center for traditional Christian culture, and a publishing house. Its greatest achievement was the catechetical courses that later became St. ­Tikhon’s Orthodox University, today the largest theological school in the former Soviet space.

But in the mid-1990s, the bishops moved to restrict the new lay organizations, subordinating them to parish rectors. Many fellowships closed down. In a move sadly typical of ideologues, searches for enemies began. The first group to be persecuted was the community of Fr. George Kochetkov, which focused on parish building and catechesis. Fr. Kochetkov’s critics accused his movement of being “anti-church.” The community escaped condemnation by church authorities. But this incident inaugurated the open division of the Church into “liberal” and “conservative” camps.

During the Soviet era, the persecuted Church had valued unity above all things. Church leaders maintained informal, often friendly, contacts with religious dissidents. By the mid-1990s, the situation changed. Conflict between liberals and conservatives became a defining feature of church life.

In the Communist Party, mainstream ideas were known as the “general line.” By demanding conformity with the general line, the Soviets suppressed dissent and maintained unity. Now, as the Church became a respected part of post-Soviet culture, many members turned their attention to managing and manipulating her influence. If the Church intended to set the spiritual and ideological agenda for the nation, these members thought, then she could not do without a general line. The “conservatives” were those who took it upon themselves to formulate this general line and determine who was in accord with it and who was not.

Thus the two camps solidified. The conservatives’ task, as they saw it, was to reestablish the social and political power of the Church. In liturgy and catechesis, they defended received practices. The “liberals,” by contrast, were those like Fr. Kochetkov, concerned with improving catechesis and promoting the role of liturgy in community life. To a degree that would have been unthinkable during the Soviet era, the two camps became mutually hostile. Church members who disagreed on theological or practical issues were now calling each other “enemies of the Church.” ­Designating themselves “defenders of the faith,” the conservatives ventured to criticize not only the laity and lower clergy, but the bishops themselves, charging them with “departures from Orthodoxy” and even, on occasion, heresy. Church Revival 1.0 fizzled.

After 2000, almost imperceptibly at first, but then more and more overtly, the Russian state abandoned the democratic model for an imperial one. It did so out of a desire to play a larger role in international politics and to overcome, in the eyes of Russians, the humiliation it had suffered with the collapse of the Soviet Union. As the state became imperial, so did the Church. As a result, ideas of what it meant to advance the Church changed radically.

This phase, which we may call “Church Revival 2.0,” continues to this day. Pastoral care has been deemphasized in favor of attention to what the Church can do in partnership with the state. The Church now focuses on the construction and restoration of property, and on the acquisition of state funds for this purpose. In the early 2000s, the Church lobbied successfully for a law returning church property that had been confiscated by the Soviet state. More and more money has been allocated for restoring old properties and constructing new churches and diocesan offices. In 2015, that allocation was about one billion rubles, enough to merit its own line in the state budget. Another ambitious plan has been to build two hundred new churches in Moscow, with the support of the government in Moscow. Meanwhile, the bureaucratization of the Church has gained momentum, with the establishment of new church agencies and an increase in paperwork and in the numbers of officials and staff. Undertaking to shape Russian national identity, the Church promotes patriotism and traditional values in coordination with government propaganda.

The Church has taken on a complex ideological significance over the last decade, not least because of the rise of the concept of Russkiy Mir, or “Russian World.” This way of speaking presumes a fraternal coexistence of the Slavic peoples—Russian, Ukrainian, Belarussian—in a single “Orthodox Civilization.” It is a powerful archetype. It is an image of unity that appeals to Russians, because it gives them a sense of a larger destiny and supports the imperial vision that increasingly characterizes Russian politics. The currency of “Russian World” within the Church today indicates that Orthodoxy is becoming a political religion.

That the Church has come to mirror the state in its rhetoric and animating vision is hardly surprising. The imperial state needs religion to provide moral legitimacy for its rule. State leaders have concluded that the democratic legitimacy arising from elections is insufficient. This is partly because it is difficult to view recent elections as truly democratic, and partly because Russia does not have a civic tradition that regards the will of the people as a convincing mandate.

In these cultural circumstances, people in high places in both the government and Church see that, with an imperial outlook of her own, Orthodoxy might be able to fill the vacuum left by the defunct Communist Party in the system of post-Soviet administration. This potential has been clear even to those functionaries who keep their distance from the Church. The need for a political religion was formulated by state authorities around 2010—something that coincided with the election of Kirill, a Russian World enthusiast, to the Patriarchal See of Moscow.

It is in one sense natural that church leaders such as Kirill would wish to promote a Russian World that transcends the political boundaries of present-day Russia. Orthodox believers are united theologically even if they live in different countries, and many are formally united under the authority of the Patriarch of Moscow. Church leaders are certainly right to further this unity, expanding and deepening our friendship in Christ across geographical borders.

But as critics point out, speaking of a Russian World serves the state more than it serves the Church. It mobilizes religion, especially the esteem of the Slavic peoples for the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, for political purposes. Its primary effect will surely be not church unity, but rather the strengthening of Russian influence in Ukraine and Belarus.

In this 2.0 phase, the Church is circling back to Sovietism, promoting conformity and dreaming of imperial expansion. In one sense, these sympathies should be understood pragmatically, as a means of currying favor with state authorities. Nonetheless, there are genuine pro-Soviet sentiments within the Russian Church. Their presence is easily explained.

In its 1.0 phase, Church Revival failed to address its top priority: “churching” those who were attracted to Orthodoxy, which meant catechizing Russians and incorporating them into the Church. The mass baptisms of the 1990s left the newly baptized unprepared for life in the Church. The Church had welcomed the uncatechized, counting on a “natural” churching to take place later, as if Christian identity would come automatically. Bishop Panteleimon of Smolensk and Vyazma describes the result:

At the beginning of the 1990s, we saw a surge of people coming to the Church. . . . Not just coming, but swarming into it. Alas, not many stayed inside. The period of active attention to the life of the Church and so-called “churching” ended very quickly. . . . In my estimation, people who go to church every Sunday amount to one percent of the country’s population, or even less.

In most cases, the newly baptized Soviet people had no interest in metanoia, no desire to change. Of course, change did arrive. It was the new post-Soviet culture (which only too soon became neo-Soviet) that changed the Church, rather than the other way around. The result is a Sovietized Christianity.

Over the last generation, the appeal of the Church to individuals and ­society has come down to tradition—the need to preserve it, the danger of neglecting it. These are legitimate concerns. But the newly baptized ex-Soviets of the last two decades have a rigid and impoverished understanding of “tradition,” which they understand as a set of rules and regulations: when to pray and what set of prayers to read, what not to eat and what else not to do during Lent, what to wear to church, and so on. For them, tradition is not a living tradition, and an understanding of tradition as a common and personal experience of life in Christ comes under suspicion as too “liberal.”

Beyond liturgy and piety, other traditions were revived: respect for the family, opposition to abortion, the banning of homosexual practice and propaganda. These measures are seen as asserting traditional Russian mores in opposition to the decadence of the West. They seem to add up to a healthy Christian conservatism. But this is rhetoric, not living tradition. The actual statistics in Russia are disastrous: 640,000 divorces to 1.2 million marriages in 2010; sixty-three abortions per hundred live births in 2011. The supposed revival of Russian morality is propaganda, not a genuine effort of social renewal. It is a way of elevating Russia over the allegedly more corrupt cultures of Western Europe and North ­America—a way of talking once again about East versus West, us versus them. The West is constructed as not just a political and economic enemy, but a spiritual one as well. This sort of thinking is the general line.

In today’s Russia, pre-revolution traditions are difficult to recover. Too much time has passed since 1917. Too many generations have been born and died, too many institutions and repositories of tradition have been eradicated. Thus, to invoke the Russian Church’s traditions of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries requires us to engage in historical reconstruction rather than to nurture beliefs and practices that are ongoing. The pre-revolution Christian traditions are dead, and they will not be revived.

In the current patrimony of Russia—whether cultural, historical, social, philosophical, or religious—there is only one tradition that is being passed on to the next generation. It is the Soviet tradition. Hence the appeal of everything Soviet, not just for the elderly but for the young. The return of this tradition in recent years, perhaps best described as neo-Soviet, is the best proof that little else is left alive in Russia.

And so the Church Revival, which in its 1.0 phase sought to revive pre-revolution Christianity, has become Church Revival 2.0, a post-Soviet civil religion providing ideological support for the Russian state. The Russian Church has become a Church of Empire, with ecclesiastical practices and institutions shaped accordingly. We seem to be at the dawn of a new epoch in Russian Orthodox history, one that in all likelihood will be known as “neo-imperial.”



The above article is highly controversial, but I do not have sufficient knowledge to correct it.  My only first hand knowledge of Russian Orthodox Church in its native soil is two weeks stay at St Elizabeth's Convent in Minsk, Belarus; but that was a phenomenal experience. It is clear that Sergei Chapnin is over-stating the emptiness of the national "imperial" religion.   Here is a different, and I guess, more balanced account:
Nevertheless, there is a long way to go. Father Michael Shields has told of the enormous number of abortions and the relatively small number of people who celebrate their Christian faith in any regular way.  Also, I have been told, that there is an enormous ignorance of Christian basics.  On the other hand, although, perhaps, the Orthodox have spent too much time gilding their churches and too little time catechising their people.  Nevertheless, the enormous energy of St Elizabeth's Convent, starting the first Orthodox school in Belarus, its publishing company, the excellent films produced under its patronage, its now internationally famed choirs, and its outreach into the community, especially among the marginalised, the mentally handicapped, drug addicts etc has very little to equal it in my experience, and this cannot be the only place; though they are still scraping a surface hardened by atheistic propaganda from 1917 till 1992.

It is clear that Patriarch Kiril and those who work with him want to restore Christendom, something impossible at the present time in western Europe which is too diverse, both ethnically and religiously and which has the strong influence of the Enlightenment. 

One of the characteristics of Vatican II was the Church adapting to a secular, multi-cultural world.   Looking back at our history, we find that, while Christendom had much to commend it, a too cosy relationship between Church and State often led the Church to under-emphasise elements of the Gospel and to confuse issues that should have been clearly distinguished.  One of the big confusions was the clear distinction, made by Christ himself, between worldly and church authority and law: the first being based on force and the second on kenotic love.  A scene that belongs to Christendom that even led to loss of faith from those observing was bishops and army chaplains blessing arms on opposite sides of a war.  

 It is clear, then, that a church at home in a multi-cultural world of people with many religions and none will have different priorities from a church that is trying to re-establish Christendom which will be open to justifiable criticisms. This will be true even between patriarchates in one Orthodox Church. They will probably justifiably criticise each other, because the Gospel does not fit comfortably into any situation in this world, and we are very weak.

Nevertheless, we have to ask if it is a Christian activity to try to rebuild Christendom, more or less how it was before the 1917 revolution.   Following the principles of ressourcement, which was the movement behind Vatican II, if an activity was traditionally allowed over a good period of time,  and the practice produced saints and high levels of Christian life, then it is an option open at any other period of time and cannot be forbidden by church authorities because they are guardians of Tradition, not its master.   Hence, Pope Benedict XVI said that he had no authority to forbid the pre-Vatican II liturgy.   On the same principle, if the Russian Orthodox Church wishes to collaborate with the State in re- establishing a Christian society in Russia, this cannot be condemned.   However, looking back at our own Catholic history, as well as looking at some of the attitudes coming out of Moscow, it is evident that too close a union between Church and State causes blind spots in the Church.

For instance, there is an enormous blind spot about the Ukrainian  Greek Catholic Church.  I would have thought that Metropolitan Hilarion's Oxford education should have taught him to look for a balanced view of historical events; but he seems completely unaware of the Greek Catholic memory of recent relations with Russia and with the Orthodox authorities.  I don't think he has ever acknowledged that Greek Catholics have been persecuted, their children confiscated, many people killed, not just in the 20th century, but in Tsarist Russia as well.  I have rarely heard mention of the Holdomor, a Stalin-made starvation of millions of people, not exclusively but mainly Greek Catholics.  There have been much accusation of proselytising in areas like Siberia, which is not a traditional area for Greek Catholics. What is not said is that they were taken there in cattle trucks by orders of Stalin. I met an old lady who was sent in a cattle truck to Siberia when she was ten with her elder sister and survived on a single piece of bread a day. Her only crime, at the age of ten, was being a Catholic.  What shocked the Orthodox and surprised the Vatican was how Stalin's attempt to crush the Greek Catholic Church had so completely failed.

Also, while I would be surprised if there has been no proselytism, because the rivalry has become bitter between the the different communities, and because some of the "converts"  to Catholicism will have a misplaced zeal, but it has nothing in common with the enforced conversion to Orthodoxy in Stalin's time, often with the enthusuastic help of Orthodox bishops.   

Metropolitan Hilarion seems to rule out any conversions which are not the result of proselytism.  Here are a couple I have come across, though I have only met the second one personally: the first was a friend of a member of my community.  Panteleimon is from Eastern Ukraine and was brought up Orthodox.  Both he and his parents are academics and highly intelligent.   When he decided to become a monk, his parents told him that there is a problem that he ought to examine before making such a commitment, the position of Rome in the Church.   He looked into the problem and came to the conclusion that being in communion with Rome is integral to Catholicism; so he joined the Greek Catholic Church, though he remains, in all things but this, thoroughly Orthodox.

The other, the one I have met a couple of times at my monastery in England, is the son of an Orthodox priest, and he was unmercifully bullied at school for this.  When he was a young man he became a Catholic in the Greek rite through his own study.  It appeared to me that his theology was rather westernised and that he is as happy to celebrate an ordinary rite Latin Mass as I am to concelebrate in the Byzantine rite. Neither of these were proselytised.

   The two arguments that I have heard are these, the theological case for Roman primacy, and the fact that no one can accuse the Greek Catholic Church of collaborating with Stalin, something that cannot be said for the Russian Orthodox Church.

Another meeting I have had with Ukrainians was the celebration of Christmas in Gloucester.   A number of Ukrainian peasants, belonging to families who now live in England, came on a visit for Christmas.  Several were short, broad shouldered men with faces like Krushchev.   What struck me was the way their faces lit up at every sung part of the Divine Liturgy, as they joined in from memory.   I remember in the old days the same intense participation at the Christmas Mass at Ottobeuron Abbey around 1962, when midnight Mass was by a local composer and 11 o'clock morning Mass was the Missa Brevis by Mozart, with professional choirs and orchestra.  "We have never had books," the Ukrainians said to me several times, "We know the Liturgy from memory."   It was clear to me that the Russian Byzantine Divine Liturgy is a part of their life blood, as is union with Rome.   That is something that Metropolitan Hilarion does not seem to realise.

Whatever we may say about how the Greek Catholic Church came to be, it remains a fact that they exist, that their faith  is intense, something they are willing to die for.  Rather like the state of Israel, whatever justifiable arguments may be made by Palestinians and Arabs against the founding of that state, the fact is that it exists, and the rights of that national community cannot be ignored or denied: neither can those of the Greek Catholics.  A heart-felt apology by the Russian Orthodox Church for the part their hierarchs played in the persecution of Greek Catholics in the 19th and 20th centuries would go a long way to reconciliation.  It might even get the Greek Catholics to examine those actions on their part that have so alienated the Orthodox.

However this is not on the Russian Orthodox agenda and won't even occur to most; just as they are not really interested in any form of pan-Orthodox unity that does not involve Russia as the centre, or any recognition of the Bishop of Rome in any real sense, because any move in that direction would divide the Church, just when it needs to be united as possible.  It is a question of power and energy.  The truth is that they are trying, for the very best of reasons, to build up Russian Orthodox society, to make Holy Russia a reality, and they want to concentrate all their forces on that.

My argument is that they are not wrong in their aim.  If Christendom was legitimate, then it is legitimate to restore it if conditions are right.  

They may not succeed.   The bulk of the population was brought up with a secular frame of mind, and this might re-assert itself.  Putin may fall and another, more western president come to office.   More and more clergy may be persuaded to follow a line like that of the Patriarch of Constantinople.   However, these things do not seem to be happening.

What if they succeed and manage to transform Russian society more and more by the Gospel?   Our Lady of Fatima said that, when Russia is converted, it will light up the whole world.   It has a long way to go; but, if that were so, then we would all benefit.

 However, if that were to happen, then the things that are not on the Russian agenda that clamour for attention, must one day be faced.  Christian unity is God's will, not just ours.  There is a time for everything under heaven, but who are we to set the timetable?  Let us continue to talk, collaborate and love, knowing that love is the conduit made by the Holy Spirit by which we become his instruments on both sides of the divide.

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